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ABSTRACT
This study examines how interest groups have reacted to the
suggested increase in the audit exemption thresholds in Finland.
The results suggest that the lobbying opponents objected to the
increase because of the benefits gained from the auditing of
financial statements. Considerable reliance is placed on the audited
accounts of Finnish small firms in maintaining societal functionality.
Hence, the results are supported by the public interest theory. In
contrast, the comment letters that supported the increase
highlighted the need to follow international trends. The findings of
the lobbying behaviour suggest that the interest groups collected
information and strategically transferred it to the ministry with the
objective of influencing the regulatory outcome. To conclude, this
study contributes to a more detailed understanding of the role that
the key arguments both for and against the proposed regulatory
change played in the case of increasing the audit exemption
thresholds. Finally, this study joins existing lobbying literature and
contributes to this stream of research by shedding light on the
importance of the argumentation strategies used in the Finnish case.
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Countries differ regarding whether they have statutory audit requirements for small firms
(Minnis & Shroff, 2017). The observed variation in audit exemption thresholds raises the
political question of the need for and value of auditing in small firms. The political discus-
sion around audit exemption thresholds has been active during the last decade in Europe
(Vanstraelen & Schelleman, 2017). This is due to the European Commission’s commitment
to policies that reduce administrative burdens on small companies. The relaxation of the
regulatory burden rests on the assumption that the reduction of statutory burdens for
small companies will boost the European economy (European Commission, 2010).
Responding to these recommendations from the EU level, policy makers in Finland
have suggested that there is an increasing need to examine the regulatory burdens for
Finnish small firms. In 2016, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (here-
after, the ministry) established a working group to examine inter alia auditing and the
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necessity of statutory audit requirements for small firms. In January 2018, the ministry
released a memorandum suggesting that the audit exemption thresholds should be
increased. After the publication of the memorandum, the proposal was sent to
different official quarters for comment. Such consultation processes are known as lobby-
ing processes, which are common in the field of accounting and standard setting (Arafat
et al., 2020; Rey et al., 2020).
Many previous studies have examined the arguments that are used against or in
support of proposals for accounting regulatory changes (e.g. Ang et al., 2000; Larson,
2008). In addition, prior studies have highlighted the importance of conducting closer
analysis of the contents of lobbyists’ submissions because they may reveal that the pos-
itions taken by the lobbyists are rarely straightforward (Ang et al., 2000). Therefore, pre-
vious literature has concentrated on the argumentation strategies (Gros &Worret, 2016).
In the current Finnish case, the comment letters are publicly available, providing a
unique opportunity to investigate lobbying in the case of audit exemption thresholds.
Hence, this study examines the following research questions:
(1) How are interest groups reacting to the suggested increase in audit exemption
thresholds?
(2) What reasons do interest groups give as to their support or opposition to the
suggested regulatory change?
(3) What kind of argumentation strategies did interest groups use in their comment
letters?
Due to the nature of the research questions, a qualitative analysis was conducted, as
suggested by Gioia et al. (2013) and Reuter and Messner (2015). The results reveal
that most of the comment letters did not support the increase in the audit exemption
thresholds. The comment letters that opposed the increase stated that statutory audits
for smaller companies create positive externalities because of their incremental contri-
bution to the strength of the information environment in which small companies
operate. Furthermore, the societal value of auditing in the Finnish context was empha-
sized. The opposing comment letters clarified that accurate financial statements and
auditing play a critical role in advancing the public interest and the suggested cost
savings are debatable. Furthermore, the lobbyists were concerned about the possible
negative consequences. Hence, the results are supported by the public interest theory.
In contrast, a minority of the comment letters supported the increase. These supporting
arguments highlighted the following of international trends, freedom of choice, and the
fact that the current thresholds are over-regulated.
The findings obtained from analyzing the lobbying behaviour suggest that the most
commonly deployed strategy of argumentation was the use of both conceptual and
self-referential arguments. These findings indicate that the interest groups might think
that their lobbying is more powerful and influential if they present self-referential and
conceptual arguments jointly to comment on the proposal to increase the audit exemp-
tion thresholds neutrally and in a balanced way. The interest groups were acting as a
transmitter of information for the ministry by providing relevant information about
the performance of the suggested increase. By providing relevant information, the lobby-
ists aimed to diminish the uncertainty related to the possible consequences. Therefore,
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the interest groups collected information and strategically transferred it to the ministry
with the objective of influencing the regulatory outcome. The results of this study are
consistent with the theory of incentives and the presence of information asymmetry.
To conclude, the political process of increasing audit exemption thresholds in a
local context is scarcely examined. Prior studies have not examined lobbying argu-
mentation strategies in the case of increasing audit exemption thresholds. Hence,
the previous studies have been silent how interest groups justified their support or
opposition to the suggested regulatory change. The present study is aiming to
address this research gap in the literature. Hence, this study joins existing political
lobbying literature and contributes to this stream of research by shedding light on
the arguments stated for and against the proposed regulatory change. The results con-
tribute to the audit exemption literature by updating and extending the previous
policy-based discussion about reducing the accounting and auditing obligations for
small companies in Finland and Europe.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
context related to the topic. Section 3 provides the background by discussing the statu-
tory audit requirement and the reduction of accounting and auditing obligations for
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the Finnish setting is described
in Section 3. Section 4 explains the research design, and Section 5 presents the findings.
Finally, Section 6 discusses the key conclusions.
2. Theoretical context
2.1. The role of politics and lobbying in the regulatory process
This section presents the concepts and relationships between politics and lobbying in
the accounting regulatory process. The accounting regulation process has been pre-
sented as a political activity with potential economic and social consequences
(Stenka & Taylor, 2010). Recent studies (Arafat et al., 2020; Gros & Worret, 2016)
have also supported this theoretical view, suggesting that the accounting rule-
making process is often considered as a political activity in which interested parties
are given the opportunity to lobby and influence the regulatory process, and possibly
the outcome. Lobbying on accounting issues has been defined as a collective term for
the actions taken by interested parties; hence, written comment letters are only one
aspect of the variety of actions encompassed by lobbying but are usually the main
source available to researchers (Weetman et al., 1996). Theoretical approaches explor-
ing the accounting and auditing regulation processes have been used in the literature.
For instance, prior literature has suggested that the public interest theory can explain
the demand for accounting and auditing regulation (e.g. Posner, 1974). Under the
public interest theory, regulators are benevolent in the sense of making decisions
that are socially efficient (Gipper et al., 2013). In particular, the public interest
theory emphasizes that regulation exists to solve certain types of market failure or
externality in markets. Lennox and Pittman (2011) stated that “information is a
public good and, as with all public goods, there is a concern that too little would
be supplied under private contracting” (p. 1655). Relatedly, Baker et al. (2014)
stated that the avowed purpose of the regulation of statutory auditing is to protect
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the public interest. According to public interest theory, regulation can be explained by
the need to prevent or correct undesirable market results. Public interest theory is
usually applied to explain regulation as an aim for economic efficiency (den
Hertog, 1999). In practice, it is suggested that a certain level of controls could be
useful to avoid business failures and therefore that the control level (statutory
audit) is for the public good. Previous literature regarding the demand side of lobby-
ing was built on the theory of incentives and has acknowledged the information asym-
metry between rule-making bodies and interest groups (Gros & Worret, 2016).
According to the theory of incentives, interest groups can act as a transmitter of infor-
mation for the rule-making body and provide relevant information about the applica-
bility and performance of a new regulatory project (Laffont & Martimort, 2009). In
other words, the incentive theory considers the paradigm of a benevolent constitution
that maximizes social welfare under incomplete information, and the rule-making
body is viewed as an informed actor (Laffont, 1999). According to the theory of incen-
tives, the interest groups may collect information and transfer it to the regulator with
the aim of influencing the regulatory outcome.
Moreover, prior studies have suggested that the lobbyists’ submissions are informative
for national regulators because the interest groups might have an informational advan-
tage (Königsgruber, 2013). Hence, lobbyists might have access to information that will
improve the regulators’ decision-making (Hansen, 2011). As a result, literature has high-
lighted the role of lobbying as a channel of information when examining expertise-based
lobbying (Hoffmann & Zülch, 2014; Königsgruber, 2013).
2.2. Argumentation strategies of lobbying participants
Prior literature has suggested that respondents may adopt sophisticated lobbying
strategies when making submissions (Manson & Zaman, 1999). Usually, the argu-
mentation of lobbying participants has been divided into the following categories:
i) conceptual arguments, ii) self-referential arguments, and iii) a mixture of concep-
tual and self-referential arguments (Gros & Worret, 2016; Hoffmann & Zülch, 2014;
Reuter & Messner, 2015). It is suggested that lobbying participants using conceptual
arguments base their reasoning on theoretical and conceptual soundness as well as
the technical practicability of the proposals (Stenka & Taylor, 2010). Lobbying
respondents using conceptual arguments also refer to the potential institutional
and legal complications caused by the proposals if they conflict (in the respondents’
view) with the current government policies or already existing regulations (Stenka &
Taylor, 2010). In contrast, self-referential arguments are statements that relate to the
effects for the issuer.
Prior studies have found mixed results when examining the argumentation strategies.
For instance, Gros and Worret (2016) found that the most used strategy of argumenta-
tion regarding the audit regulation in the EU was conceptually based argumentation, fol-
lowed by the other types. Hoffmann and Zülch (2014) examined lobbying strategies in
accounting standard setting in the parliamentary environment of Germany. Their
findings suggested that the most common lobbying strategy of associations was concep-
tual arguments; however, among parliamentarians, the most common strategy was self-
referential arguments.
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3. Background and the current case
3.1. Political discussion on reducing the accounting and auditing obligations for
SMEs
Harmonization of practices is a general political goal in the EU. However, statutory audit
requirements vary significantly among EU countries (Accountancy Europe, 2019). Stat-
utory audits are not explicitly required for companies defined as “small undertakings,”
and recital 43 of the Accounting Directive clarifies that this omission is intentional.
However, Member States can impose audits on small undertakings as a matter of national
law, although they should be appropriate to the conditions and needs of the company and
the users of its accounts. The 2013 EU Accounting Directive defines the current EU
maxima for audit exemption thresholds, and Table 1 presents a timeline of EU
maxima thresholds.
As setting financial reporting requirements for small firms is a question of public
policy, it has been proposed that a socially accepted regulatory solution concerning the
obligations of SMEs needs to be designed such that it serves the public interest rather
than special interests (Minnis & Shroff, 2017). Literature points that the demand for
private firms’ accounting information being lower than for public companies, the accu-
racy of the information filed by private companies is potentially important. Politicians
and regulators need to understand the causes and consequences of private company
reporting when trying to gain the most favourable level of statutory audit regulation.
The political discussion on reducing the regulatory burden on SMEs has concentrated
on the main arguments supporting and opposing the accounting and auditing obli-
gations. The supporting reasoning emphasizes the benefits obtained from requiring
small firms to disclose audited financial statements. In particular, the importance of
reliable financial information for the owners and managers of small enterprises and
their stakeholders is highlighted (Dedman & Kausar, 2012). Relatedly, Hope et al.
(2011) provided evidence that credible financial information plays an important role
in reducing information asymmetry between private firms and external providers of
finance.
Furthermore, the supporting arguments highlight that the tax authorities obtain third-
party assurance of the quality of parts of small firms’ tax filings (Downing & Langli,
2019). Höglund and Sundvik (2019) emphasized that the tax authorities might be the
main user of small companies’ accounts. Hence, in an environment in which taxation
is essentially based on financial reports, the accuracy of financial statements is crucial
for the public interest.
In contrast, those views that promote the reduction of statutory obligations emphasize
that it is of crucial importance for the accounting systems applied by small enterprises to
Table 1. EU maxima for audit exemption (€).
2003 2008 2013
Balance sheet total €3.65 m €4.40 m €6.00 m
Net turnover €7.30 m €8.80 m €12.00 m
Average number of employees 50 50 50
Notes: Adopted from the Council Directive 2003/38/EC, the EU Fourth Company Law Directive 2006/46/EC, and the EU
Directive 2013/34/EU.
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meet their needs, providing necessary information while avoiding an unjustified admin-
istrative burden (Tabone & Baldacchino, 2003). It has been suggested that statutory obli-
gations can be reduced by cutting unnecessary regulations and, in doing so, giving SMEs
time to focus on their core competencies (SMEs of the EPP, 2019).
4. The Finnish setting
Finland joined the EU in 1995 and, as a Member State of the EU, the regulation of audit-
ing in Finland complies with the directives of the European Commission (Niemi et al.,
2012). However, as legislation on auditing and accounting is issued at the national
level in the EU countries, differences in legal frameworks remain. The Finnish Auditing
Act prescribes the general qualifications of auditors, the scope of the statutory audit, and
auditors’ reporting. The act also mandates regulatory bodies to authorize and supervise
the members of the profession. However, the current Finnish legislation does not require
a similar kind of competence qualification for bookkeepers (Government of Finland,
2015, 2016).
The smallest corporations are exempted from the statutory audit obligation, but it
must be noted that the audit exemption1 was not introduced until 2008 and, even
then, it has only been available to micro-companies (Ojala et al., 2016). During the
past decade, reducing the administrative burdens of audits has been a key issue in
the political discussions concerning small companies in Finland (Finnish Ministry of
Economic Affairs and Employment, 2010, 2018a). In April 2016, a working group
started to examine possible solutions to lighten the statutory auditing regulation.
After the survey work, in January 2018, a memorandum that suggested increases in
the audit exemption thresholds was released. The memorandum stated that an entity
should be exempt from a statutory audit if one of the following criteria is met for
the two previous financial periods: (1) The total balance sheet is under 350,000
euros; (2) The turnover or equivalent is under 700,000 euros; (3) The number of per-
sonnel is under 10. The memorandum suggested that the change would lighten the
legislation, increase the freedom of businesses, and decrease the annual administrative
costs for the smallest companies (Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employ-
ment, 2018a). An analysis of the Finnish business structure suggests that Finland is
a country of small businesses. The following statistics support this view and present
the cornerstone of the Finnish economy. Overall, there are 360,818 companies in
Finland, and they employ 1.4 million people and pay taxes that are used to fund ser-
vices that everyone uses. To sum up, of all companies, 340,371 (94.3%) employ fewer
than 10 people, and these companies are categorized as micro-enterprises. In addition,
there are 16,843 (4.7%) small enterprises, 2,971 (0.8%) medium enterprises, and 633
large enterprises (0.2%) in Finland (Statistics Finland, 2020). Hence, it can be suggested
that SMEs contribute significantly to Finland’s non-financial business economy. They
generate 60.9% of the total value added, slightly more than the EU average of 56.8%
(European Commission, 2018).
1According to the current Finnish Auditing Act 1141/2015, an entity is exempt from a statutory audit if two of the follow-
ing criteria are met for the two previous financial periods: (1) the total balance sheet is under 100,000 euros; (2) the
turnover or equivalent is under 200,000 euros; and (3) the number of personnel is under three. The limits for the
duty to carry out an audit are exceptionally low in Finland, significantly lower than in other EU countries.
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There are also other institutional characteristics in Finland that should be noted.
Finland is classified as a Continental European country (Niemi & Sundgren, 2012),
and these countries typically have a code law system and a bank-based finance system
(LaPorta et al., 1998). Finland is therefore a bank-dominated code law country. In
addition to trade credit, loans from banks and other financial institutions are the most
common source of external finance for Finnish small firms (Niemi & Sundgren, 2012).
In Finland, as in code law countries in general, small firms typically have more concen-
trated ownership structures than firms in common law countries (Karjalainen, 2011).
Hence, the separation of ownership and control might not be so evident among small
firms in Finland. Niskanen et al. (2011), using a sample of Finnish small firms, found
that the demand for audit quality is driven by owner–creditor agency costs rather than
conflicts of interest induced by the separation of ownership and control. Information
asymmetry and agency conflicts between owners and creditors might be more relevant
than information asymmetry between managers and owners in the Finnish context (Kar-
jalainen, 2011).
Moreover, Finland has a high alignment between financial reporting and tax account-
ing (Höglund & Sundvik, 2019). In a setting of high tax alignment, financial statements
are used as a basis for taxation and, therefore, the quality of financial statements plays an
essential role because the tax returns are based on financial statements (Downing &
Langli, 2019). High-quality financial statements are important to the Finnish authorities
to ensure that the taxes are accurate and that small companies in Finland are operating
according to the laws and are not, for instance, associated with the grey economy.2
5. Research design
5.1. Data and general remarks
The proposal to increase the audit exemption thresholds was open to public comments
from January 16, 2018 to March 13, 2018. In August 2018, the proposal was open for a
second comment round, with a deadline of the beginning of October 2018. In all, 85
comment letters3 were received, 42 in the first round and 43 in the second round. All
the comment letters were categorized according to the type of respondent that they rep-
resented, and the following categories were used: i) accounting and auditing profession,
ii) public authorities, iii) users of financial statements, iv) academia, and v) others. The
comment letters were coded into three different groups relating to whether they agreed
with, disagreed with, or were undecided regarding the increase in the audit exemption
thresholds. This process led to the construction of tables that classified the subjects
2Companies participating in the grey economy in Finland usually have a turnover of less than EUR 2 million. The total
number of grey economy audits carried out in 2019 was 588. The taxes levied in these cases amounted to 19.3
million EUR of valued-added taxes (25.5 million EUR with tax increases) and 12.6 million EUR of employer contributions
(19.2 million EUR with tax increases). The unreported earnings found in the audits amounted to 86.6 million EUR and
the taxes levied on them were 23.5 million EUR. The audits found that approximately 25 million EUR in hidden divi-
dends had not been declared. Using falsified receipts in accounting is a typical means of tax evasion. A total of
about 4,850 falsified receipts were found during tax audits in 2019, with a value of over 31 million EUR (Finnish Tax
Administration, 2020).
3The Federation of Finnish Enterprises (Suomen Yrittäjät) and the Federation of Finnish Financial Administration (Talous-
hallintoliitto) produced one statement together in the first round. Thus, the total number of lobbying participants is 86.
The comment letters are available at https://tem.fi/hankesivu?tunnus=TEM031:00/2016.
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and topics addressed most frequently by the respondents. Table 2 presents the summary
of the comment letters and interest groups.
Due to the nature of the research questions, a qualitative content analysis was con-
ducted, as suggested by Gioia et al. (2013) and Reuter and Messner (2015). Qualitative
research is appropriate for providing in-depth awareness of the perspectives of the
audit exemption discussion. The flexibility of qualitative research is likely to uncover
new phenomena in the audit exemption context. Using publicly available documents,
this study aimed to retain the richness of the views expressed and the arguments
advanced by lobbyists. Considering the different argumentation strategies used by inter-
est groups, this study distinguished four strategies. Arguments related to the increase in
audit exemption thresholds were classified as conceptual arguments, self-referential argu-
ments, both types, or no argumentation strategy at all (Gros & Worret, 2016; Hoffmann
& Zülch, 2014). This study defined conceptually based argumentation as argumentation
that is theory based and refers primarily to the notions linked to auditing issues and to
technical issues concerning the topic under consideration. Interest groups that use such
arguments base their reasoning on theoretical and conceptual soundness as well as the
technical feasibility of the proposal. Respondents also refer to potential institutional
and legal complications caused by the proposal if they seem to be in conflict (in the
respondents’ view) with the current government policies or already-existing regulations
(Stenka & Taylor, 2010). In contrast, this study defined arguments as self-referential if
they relate directly to the effects on the interest group. For instance, arguments stated
by the audit profession are self-referential if the effects of the proposed changes to the
audit profession are mentioned. Furthermore, this study captures the use of both argu-
ments and the use of no arguments at all.
5.2. Arriving at concepts
An inductive analysis was conducted, in line with Gioia et al. (2013). The principal objec-
tive was to gain a holistic understanding of what was discussed and highlighted, but also
Table 2. Summary of the comment letters and interest groups.
Interest group
Number of comment letters
that supported the proposal
first round (second round)
Number of comment letters
that opposed the proposal
first round (second round)
Number of comment letters that
did not take a direct stance on the
issue first round (second round)




2* (2) 3 (3)









4 (5) 6 (4)
Users 5 (3) 4 (2) 2 (0)
Academia 0 (1) 1 (4) 1 (0)
Others 4* (4) 1 (2) 2 (3)
Total 10 (10) 21(26) 11 (7)
Notes: * The Federation of Finnish Enterprises and the Federation of Finnish Financial Administration produced one
comment letter together in the first round.
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to ensure that all the important aspects of the data were captured. This approach was
adopted because it is ideal for examining complex phenomena. The inductive analysis
suggested by Gioia et al. (2013) has been used recently in many accounting and auditing
studies (see, for instance, Daoust & Malsch, 2020).
In the first step, all the comment letters were read and notes were made on similarities
and differences among the responses. Conclusions on the content analysis were drawn by
identifying themes throughout the transcription of the data. According to Azungah
(2018), inductive analysis refers to approaches that primarily use detailed readings of
raw data to derive concepts, categories, and themes. In inductive analysis, although
the results might be affected by the evaluation objectives or questions outlined by the
researcher, the findings arise directly from the analysis of the raw data, not from prior
expectations (Thomas, 2006). To conclude, the data was analyzed to discern similar
meanings with the aim of identifying higher-level convergence and then generating
first-order concepts, as suggested by Gioia et al. (2013). Following the establishment of
the first-order categories, the next phase of the analysis involved identifying links
among the first-order concepts to group them into second-order themes. Once a work-
able set of second-order themes and concepts was at hand, the final phase was to inves-
tigate whether it was possible to distil the emergent second-order themes even further
into “aggregate dimensions” (Gioia et al., 2013). The aggregate dimensions represent
the overarching themes obtained from the data analysis. These categories may stem
from the analyst’s insights to explain concisely what is happening (Jonsen & Jehn, 2009).
6. Findings
The following section contains the findings. First, an overview of the lobbying partici-
pants is presented. Second, the results of the qualitative analysis of the comment
letters are reported. The appropriate representative quotations are included in the
paper to illustrate the arguments in opposition to or in favour of the increase in audit
exemption thresholds. Moreover, the key arguments for and against the proposal are dis-
cussed relative to prior studies and the related literature. Further, the analysis reveals
comment letters4 that did not comment directly on the issue. Finally, the latter part of
the inductive analysis and the use of different argumentation strategies are discussed.
6.1. Overview of interest groups
Based on the function and the legal status of the respondents, it was possible to segregate
the lobbyists into five different groups. The accounting and auditing profession includes
Big 4 firms, mid-tier audit firms, recognized supervisory bodies, professional bodies, and
individual auditors. The public authorities include national ministries, governmental
institutions, and auditor oversight bodies. The users of the financial statements
include institutional investors, financial analysts, unions, and shareholder organizations.
The interest group of academics comprises researchers and individuals from academia.
4The respondents within this group did not comment directly on whether they supported or opposed the increase. These
comment letters presented a solid discussion of the importance of a financial statement audit, emphasizing that audit
exemption thresholds are political decisions made by governments and these decisions should be made with care.
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The interest group “others” includes respondents who could not be attributed to one of
the other interest groups.
An overview of the participating interest groups (Table 3) shows that the most
comment letters were submitted by the accounting and auditing profession (28 of
86 lobbying participants in the sample, or 32.6%). This finding is consistent with
the prior literature. The high involvement of the accounting and auditing profession
is reasonable because this group might have an informational advantage and be
affected the most by future changes in audit regulation. Hence, it could be expected
that they engage actively in the lobbying process. Based on the information asymmetry
between the lobbying participants and the regulator, it is expected that, when expres-
sing opposing views, lobbyists might explicitly want to reduce the information asym-
metry and emphasize the unintended consequences of the proposed changes.
Relatedly, it is argued that audit firms are lobbying because they want to improve
financial reporting for altruistic reasons and it is in the best interest of the profession
(Gipper et al., 2013). Audit professionals might have an informational advantage
regarding the relevance and potential effects of the increased audit exemption
thresholds. This study reveals that they exhibit opposing views. This observation is
in line with Jorissen et al. (2006), who suggested that lobbying might reveal infor-
mation related to future consequences.
Public authorities represent the second-highest participation rate. These are mostly
national authorities and national auditor oversight bodies (27 of 86 lobbying participants
in the sample, or 31.4%). This result might initially be unexpected because it is generally
inconsistent with prior studies. However, Gros and Worret (2016) found that public
authorities accounted for the third-highest participation rate in their study, and they
suggested that the high involvement of public authorities might in fact be explainable.
In the current case, the memorandum was sent purposely to different public authorities
for a comment round and this might explain the participation. In addition, in the current
study, public authorities might have extensive knowledge of national peculiarities related
to audit exemption thresholds that they would like to highlight and emphasize in the
comment letters. For instance, the tax authorities highlighted the interface between
financial statements and taxation.
Comparatively low participation in the current lobbying case is exhibited by the users
of the financial statements (eight of 86 lobbying participants in the sample, or 9.3%) and
academics (seven of 86 lobbying participants, or 8.1%), and these findings are partly con-
sistent with prior studies. For instance, Tandy andWilburn (1996) stated that, despite the
pleas for academics’ involvement in the standard-setting process, the accounting aca-
demic community appears to be uninvolved. The reasons for academics’ participation
may include, for instance, the feeling of professional involvement and the contribution
Table 3. Summary of the lobbying participants.
First round Second round Total
Accounting and auditing profession 13 (30.2%) 15 (34.9%) 28 (32.6%)
Public authorities 15 (34.9%) 12 (27.9%) 27 (31.4%)
Users 6 (13.9%) 2 (4.7%) 8 (9.3%)
Academia 2 (4.7%) 5 (11.6%) 7 (8.1%)
Others 7 (16.3%) 9 (20.9%) 16 (18.6%)
Total 43 (100.0%) 43 (100.0%) 86 (100.0%)
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to knowledge sharing. However, the incentives for academics to participate seem to be
limited, and academics may think that the cost of participation, such as the time and
effort involved in preparing a comment letter, is too high. From their perspective, the
limited time available should be used for teaching and publishing research.
To conclude, the accounting and auditing profession is more involved in lobbying
activities within the current lobbying case than the other interest groups, thus suggesting
the presence of potential informational advantages and motives for reducing information
asymmetry.
6.2. Most frequently used arguments against the proposal to increase audit
exemption thresholds
Table 4 presents the framework for the most frequently used arguments against the pro-
posal. The majority of the submissions (86% in the first round and 73% in the second
round) argued that the case for limiting the requirement for small company audits
appeared to be motivated solely by the desire to reduce cost burdens that are not
defined precisely. Hence, the respondents were skeptical that the suggested cost
savings would be significant. To illustrate this, the following quote is presented.
Auditing is not a statutory burden, so there is no need to lighten this requirement. The
auditing of micro companies costs approximately €500–1 000 for one year, and in practice
a firm will get very relevant and useful advice, which will help an entrepreneur or firm to
avoid the pitfalls. This is a very small amount (for instance, when the turnover is €700
000, the audit fee is about 0.1% of the firm’s turnover), and, with this amount, all users
of financial statements and the entrepreneur him- or herself will get audited financial state-
ments. (Comment Letter [CL] 69, recognized supervisory body)
The elements discussed above are in line with the observations made by Collis (2010) and
Collis et al. (2004). For instance, Collis et al. (2004 suggested that firms considered the
benefits of having their accounts audited to outweigh the costs. Relatedly, Collis
Table 4. Most frequently used arguments against the increase in audit exemption thresholds (n = 21





. The reduction of administrative costs is not an appropriate reason for increasing
thresholds.
18(86) 19(73)
. Auditing creates many positive externalities because audits increase the trust in
financial information
12(57) 14(54)
. Respondents suggested alternatives to the statutory audit, for example an
extended review.
9(43) 12(46)
. The audited financial statements are crucial for potential lenders and support the
firm in obtaining outside financing.
13(62) 18(69)
. The performance of accountants and accounting firms is not regulated and
monitored like the performance of auditors in Finland.
8(38) 12(45)
. The fears about reduced tax revenue, an increased grey economy, and economic
crime are actual and evident. The respondents required an impact assessment of
the increase in the thresholds.
18(86) 20(77)
. Because the regulatory changes to audit exemption in Sweden were not
successful, Finland should not make the same mistakes.
14(67) 15(58)
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(2010) emphasized that, when analyzing small firms, the relative cost burden is not con-
sidered to be substantial. Hence, these findings from prior studies justify the concerns
raised by most of the comment letters that the cost savings might not be crucial. In
addition, 57% of comment letters in the first round (54% in the second round) stated
that statutory audits create many positive benefits. Confidence and trust in smaller com-
panies’ performance were highly acknowledged because high-quality audits support
financial stability. The comment letters highlighted the societal value of audits in the
Finnish context and underlined that statutory audits are a useful safeguard to ensure
the accuracy of financial information. Therefore, it can be interpreted that reliable
accounting information is seen as a foundation pillar for Finnish business. The following
quote illustrates this view.
The importance of auditing for the Finnish society is extremely clear. The size and structure
of Finnish companies are such that, by exempting more companies, the financial infor-
mation will not be assured and the quality of financial information will decline considerably.
(CL69, recognized supervisory body)
The concerns associated with regulatory relaxation and a decrease in the quality of
financial information have been emphasized in prior studies. For instance, Clatworthy
and Peel (2013) argued that proposals to relax mandatory audit requirements may
lead to a doubling of the accounting errors. Clatworthy and Peel (2013) and Dedman
and Kausar (2012) stated that their findings should be of interest to policy makers
who are considering exempting more firms from mandatory audits because statutory
audits are valuable in terms of observable benefits (higher quality information).
Hence, the arguments in the comment letters concerning possible declining financial
information quality are justified according to the prior accounting literature.
Even though the comment letters clarified that mandatory auditing plays a critical role
in advancing the public interest, the respondents recommended that small firms could
benefit from simplified auditing requirements (43% of the comment letters in the first
round and 46% in the second round). An extended review could mean an audit
having a narrower scope than a full audit; this is usually confined to specific accounts
or operations. The following quote refers to this suggestion.
According to our view, it would be appropriate to investigate the replacement of auditing for
micro companies by a review conducted by an auditor. The memorandum mentions that
there are also countries where there are two kind of thresholds, one for extended reviews
and one for statutory auditing (i.e. Denmark, Estonia, and France). We think that these
kinds of arrangements could also be implemented in Finland. (CL71, accounting and audit-
ing profession, Big 4 firm)
The prior literature has highlighted the possibility that small firms could benefit from an
extended review (Haapamäki, 2018), but prior studies have not extensively investigated
the consequences of an extended review. Therefore, the suggestion of examining alterna-
tives to statutory audits should be relevant and worthwhile investigating in the Finnish
context, as the comment letters proposed.
Of the respondents, 62% (second round: 69%) suggested that there are benefits in
having an auditor for the small firms themselves. Specifically, the comment letters
emphasized that the audited financial statements of small firms are crucial for potential
lenders and the audited accounts are vital to banks’ lending decisions. Further concerns
12 E. HAAPAMÄKI
and other thoughts associated with auditing profession were also raised. The following
quotes highlight these issues.
Audited financial statements support the firm getting outside financing. In the traditional
banking finance, the decision to get financing is received faster when the company has
audited financial statements. In the newer financing models, like crowd financing, the
role of the auditor is highlighted because of the investor protection. (CL65, recognized
supervisory body)
The consequences of increasing the thresholds would be considerable for auditors who work
in the provinces compared with auditors who work in Southern Finland. The increase of the
audit exemption thresholds would affect the availability of auditing services or even result in
a loss of services. If the majority of clients disappears, then the ground to exercise a pro-
fession and offer other services will also disappear. (CL84, accounting and auditing pro-
fession, mid-tier audit firm)
Prior research has highlighted the benefits from audited accounts. For instance, Hope
et al. (2011) emphasized that audited accounts reduce the external financing constraints
for small firms. Finland is a country of small businesses and therefore it can be suggested
that the audited accounts play a significant role in the external funding process. Trade
credit and loans from banks and other financial institutions are the most common
source of external finance for Finnish small firms (Niemi & Sundgren, 2012).
In addition, prior studies have examined the concentration of audit markets. Regula-
tors around the world are concerned about the potentially harmful effects of high audit
market concentration on audit pricing and quality. Clacher et al. (2019) stated that a lack
of competition will lead to potential conflicts and uncompetitive pricing. Bigus and Zim-
mermann (2008) found evidence that only a larger number of audit firms compete in the
market segment of small client firms because the Big Four auditors dominate the listed
firms’ audit market. Hence, it could be possible that the loss of auditing services in
Finland could lead to a high audit market concentration. Therefore, the interest
groups’ concerns emphasized in the comment letters have been recognized in the
prior accounting literature. Furthermore, the comment letters acknowledged that a
good accountant (bookkeeper) will always carry out a certain level of checks to ensure
that the accounts are not misleading. However, unaudited accounts do not convey the
same degree of assurance as audited accounts. This might be because the performance
of accountants and accounting firms is not regulated and monitored like the performance
of auditors in Finland. This was a particular concern in 38% (45%) of the comment
letters. The respondents valued auditors as being independent, responsible for the
work conducted, and under official supervision. For the public interest, these are unques-
tionably essential. The following quote is in line with the above argument.
When the current Finnish law does not have any competence requirements for accountants,
anyone can keep the accounts without any qualifications or authorization. In these cases, the
external auditor can be the only outside expert to evaluate the accuracy of accounting
records and the financial position of the firm. The perception of possible mistakes in the
accounting records requires expertise; therefore, the importance of an external auditor is
emphasized. (CL7, public authority)
Finally, many of the respondents were concerned about the unintended consequences of
increasing the thresholds and required more research on the previous change in the audit
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exemption thresholds in Finland. The interest groups underlined fears related to reduced
tax revenue and a grey economy. Hence, the comment letters emphasized that, because of
the inadequate impact assessment, the drafting of a legislative proposal should not be
continued. Interestingly, 67% (second round: 58%) of the comment letters stated that,
because the regulatory changes to the audit exemption in Sweden were not successful,
Finland should not make the same mistakes. The comment letters stated that, because
the evidence from Sweden has highlighted an increased risk of accounting errors, tax
evasion, and economic crime in particular, the audit exemption thresholds should not
be increased in Finland. The following quotes support these arguments.
The current proposal does not contain a comprehensive impact assessment. The regulatory
process should not be continued without a thorough and deep analysis of its impacts. It
should be investigated what kind of expertise is required from the preparer of the financial
statements and what has been the role of external auditors in the public interest. This is extre-
mely important. The current proposal that underestimates the consequences of abandoning
statutory audits is not suitable for legislative initiatives. (CL4, recognized supervisory body)
The Swedish report about the consequences of the increase of audit exemption thresholds
has been ignored. The Swedish report suggests that the consequences were negative; for
instance, the accounting offenses increased and the quality of financial statements decreased.
This kind of results should be considered carefully when planning to increase the thresholds.
(CL7, public authority)
The prior literature has highlighted that it is essential to improve and optimize the regu-
latory quality in the EU (Adelle & Weiland, 2012). Regulatory impact assessment is one
the most important tools to prepare new legislation and to review and reform the existing
legislation (Kirkpatrick & Parker, 2008). Thus, the suggestions to conduct a comprehen-
sive impact assessment before continuing the legislative proposal might be warranted.
When considering the negative consequences suggested and the role of the auditor in
fraud prevention, it has been argued that auditors acknowledge a responsibility for
detecting material fraud (Jeppesen, 2019). Hence, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable
assurance that material misstatements are detected because of the nature of audit evi-
dence. Prior studies have also emphasized that, in a high tax alignment setting, the
quality of financial information plays an essential role because the tax returns are
based on financial statements (Höglund & Sundvik, 2019). Moreover, prior studies
have stressed the role of statutory audits in preventing the development of the grey
economy by detecting and revealing financial crimes (Amara et al., 2020; Norton,
2018). Therefore, the interest groups’ concerns associated with the negative conse-
quences have been acknowledged in the literature.
6.3. Most frequently used arguments to support the proposal to increase audit
exemption thresholds
Table 5 presents the most frequently used arguments supporting the increase. It was
apparent from the comment letters that that auditing should not be mandatory for all
small companies: 50% of the comment letters in the first round and 50% in the second
round suggested that the current thresholds are unusually low compared with those in
other EU countries. Therefore, the comment letters emphasized that the harmonization
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of the statutory audit requirement is desirable and that the thresholds could be increased
because Finland should follow the guidelines for international auditing practices. The fol-
lowing quote describes this.
According to the Accounting Directive, the statutory auditing can be an administrative
burden for small and micro companies and the EU countries should not require statutory
auditing of these companies without cogent reasons. The suggested increase is in line
with the EU Commission; therefore, it is difficult to justify the unusually low audit exemp-
tion thresholds in Finland compared to other Member States. (CL22, other)
To illustrate, the Accounting Directive was planned to ensure that the EU policies and
actions are small business friendly (European Commission, 2014). Relatedly, Tabone
and Baldacchino (2003) underlined that extra bureaucracy for small companies
should be avoided. The above statements from comment letters are principally in
line with the EU policies, therefore, the proposal was endorsed in the consultation
processes.
Similarly, 50% (second round: 50%) of the respondents supported the argument
that low audit exemption thresholds do not give small companies the opportunity
to evaluate the costs and benefits of auditing by themselves. The decision to hire
an auditor should be a voluntary decision and not forced by law. The respondents
also suggested that small firms require fewer rules, more flexibility, and freedom in
their decision-making. Furthermore, the audit fees are one of the main reasons men-
tioned in opposition to mandatory auditing for smaller companies. The following
quotes support these views.
If the company has a narrow ownership base and it doesn’t need external financing, it is
reasonable to assume that it might not need statutory auditing under these circumstances.
Therefore, a micro company should have the opportunity to decide whether it uses an
auditor by itself. (CL56, other)
According to our view, the proposed increase improves companies’ freedom to decide for
their own businesses in a way that is suitable for them… Furthermore, releasing companies
from this requirement would lighten the administrative burden and would bring cost
savings. (CL27, public authority)
Table 5.Most frequently used arguments to support the increase in the audit exemption thresholds (n





. The current audit exemption thresholds are too low compared with those in other
EU countries.
5(50) 5(50)
. Low audit exemption thresholds do not give small companies the opportunity to
evaluate the costs and benefits of auditing.
5(50) 5(50)
. Cost is one of the main reasons mentioned for eliminating the mandatory audit.
The costs of the universal application of the requirement to have the accounts
audited fall disproportionately on small companies.
5(50) 4(40)
. The Finnish governmental trend should focus on removing administrative costs. 5(50) 4(40)
. The statutory audit requirement for small companies is argued to be unnecessary
protectionism.
2(20) 2(20)
. Member States should release small companies from the statutory audit
requirement if there is no specific justification to demand it. In Finland, these
particular reasons do not exist.
3(30) 3(30)
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Prior studies have suggested that the mandatory auditing of small companies is complex
because small companies exist in an environment in which stakeholders tend to be closer
to the company and are able to request extra information directly (Hope et al., 2012).
Tabone and Baldacchino (2003) concluded that owner-managers of small companies
express the wish to reduce business compliance costs; in particular, the audit fee was
suggested as a costly overhead. At the same time, Tabone and Baldacchino’s (2003)
results revealed that owner-managers acknowledge that a statutory audit requirement
is justifiable on the grounds of safeguarding societal interests. Hence, the above argu-
ments from the comment letters can be rationalized according to the prior accounting
literature. However, the prior studies did not provide a clear consensus on this matter;
for instance, Lennox and Pittman (2011) emphasized that research cannot provide
policy makers with a definitive answer to the question of whether audits should be volun-
tary or mandatory because companies focus on their own private costs and benefits when
considering whether to pay for an audit.
Finally, 50% (second round: 40%) of the submissions clarified that the current govern-
mental trend in Finland should focus on removing the norms and excessive demands.
The statutory audit requirement was suggested to be unnecessary protectionism that
affects smaller firms’ competitiveness in international markets. The respondents high-
lighted that, according to the Accounting Directive, Member States should release
small companies from the statutory audit requirement if there is no specific justification
to demand it, that is, special circumstances or the needs of companies or users of financial
information. Of the respondents, 30% (second round: 30%) suggested that, in Finland,
these particular reasons do not exist. For these reasons, the respondents stated that the
proposed increase in audit exemption thresholds is supported. The following quotes
refer to the arguments presented above.
The suggested increase in audit exemption thresholds does not affect the grey economy. It is
not reasonable to require all small companies to pay the audit fees annually on the grounds
of preventing financial crime a little. It should also be highlighted that an auditor is not an
inspector of taxes nor an inspector of financial offenses but an actor who carries out the
control function. (CL22, other)
The statutory auditing proceedings are based on the International Standards on Auditing,
which are directed to large companies. These procedures also include actions that are not
necessary for smaller companies. (CL34, other)
According to the statistics of the Finnish Tax Administration, it can cautiously be
suggested that tax evasion exists in Finland and can be considered as a complex
problem (Finnish Tax Administration, 2020). Hence, the comment letters might under-
estimate the level of the grey economy and the consequences associated with it. There-
fore, it might be controversial to suggest that the increase in the audit exemption does
not affect the grey economy.
However, it has been emphasized that there is no need for a small entity to follow the
same standards as a large company (Tabone & Baldacchino, 2003). The current Inter-
national Standards on Auditing (ISAs) have become quite complex for the needs of
smaller entities because audit regulators and standard setters focus on protecting
capital markets. It has been argued that ISAs have moved further away from the long-
desired “think small first” approach. For instance, the auditor designs and implements
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appropriate audit procedures to mitigate the risks related to material misstatements. The
risk analysis when applying ISAs is very demanding and does not necessarily result in the
efficient detection of the real risks in a non-complex environment (Accountancy Europe,
2018). Hence, the arguments related to the simplified regulatory procedures are justified.
6.4. Results of inductive analysis
The inductive analysis consisted of three stages. Firstly, similar arguments supporting
and opposing the proposal were identified by examining their frequency in the
comment letters. This stage of the analysis revealed the first-order concepts. A detailed
examination of the comment letters during both consultation rounds suggests that the
interest groups did not change their views. For instance, if the interest group was
against the increase in the first round, it was also against the proposal during the
second consultation round, and vice versa. The results also revealed that similar key argu-
ments were used for and against the proposal during both consultation rounds. This
finding might indicate that the interest groups were relatively convinced of their perspec-
tive on the regulatory proposal. This observation shows that the interest groups con-
sidered the lobbying an intense communication process (Koeppl, 2000). Hence, this
finding relates to the role of lobbyists: they might act as information transmitters to reg-
ulators (Gros & Worret, 2016); however, they might seek to influence the regulatory
outcome by providing convincing reasoning, presenting it so that the regulator will be
receptive. Furthermore, the use of similar key arguments during both consultation
rounds could be linked to the use of argumentation strategies, and the results associated
with lobbying strategies are discussed comprehensively in Section 5.5. Secondly, the key
arguments for and against the proposal (named first-order concepts) are the starting
point for the second-order concepts. In this second-order analysis, the aim was to inves-
tigate whether the emerging themes suggested concepts that might help to describe and
explain the phenomena under examination using fewer conceptual taxonomies. The
results of the second-order analysis yielded five categories that indicate different con-
siderations of the argument discussions related to the audit exemption thresholds. The
analysis revealed that there are three second-order themes for opposing arguments: i)
the societal importance of auditing is valued, ii) regulatory change is not justified by
expedience, and iii) there are unintended consequences of increasing the audit exemp-
tion threshold. For arguments that supported the increase in audit exemption thresholds,
the analysis identified two second-order concepts: i) the current low thresholds are over-
regulated and ii) there should be freedom of choice for smaller companies.
After finalizing the second-order themes, this study investigated their underlying
dimensions to understand how the various themes interacted with and related to one
another within a broader context. To conclude, Table 6 presents the full set of first-
order concepts, second-order themes, and aggregate dimensions. This process has
been suggested to formulate the data structure, and it has been indicated as a pivotal
step in the entire research approach (Gioia et al., 2013). The data structure allows the
data to be configured into a sensible visual aid while providing a graphic presentation
on how the concepts progressed from raw data to terms and themes. In the final stage
of the inductive analysis process, those five major second-order themes were finally
assembled into aggregate dimensions. The aggregate dimensions establish the umbrella
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concepts that describe the phenomenon. Hence, the analysis revealed two main dimen-
sions that are related to audit exemption thresholds. The first dimension is the socio-
economic benefits of auditing, which is the aggregate dimension for opposing the
increase. This finding indicates that the opposing reasoning emphasizes the accuracy
of financial information of small companies as a social priority compared with the
need to reduce the regulatory burden for small firms. However, the second aggregate
dimension is harmonization with international (EU) trends, which is the dimension
for supporting the increase. This finding indicates that the supporting reasoning empha-
sizes that Finnish small firms should not have stricter rules than their international
counterparts.
To conclude, the role of these second-order and aggregate dimensions is notable
because they help to understand the wider picture behind the discussion related to the
increase in audit exemption thresholds. In other words, the aggregate dimensions
present a simplified view of the different arguments supporting and opposing the
suggested increase. Furthermore, they help to comprehend the lobbying arena in the
context of reducing auditing obligations for SMEs. For instance, in EU countries,
raising the thresholds to meet the EU harmonization objectives might be a challenging
goal to achieve because the societal purpose of the statutory audit requirement varies
among the Member States. This discussion leads to the question of whether it is even
possible to harmonize the statutory audit requirements across the EU. Privately held
firms are particularly significant players in the European economy, and the role of audit-
ing seems to differ across EU countries (Downing & Langli, 2019). For instance, the wide
divergence of audit exemption thresholds among EU countries may reflect different
countries’ historical experiences and views of stakeholders’ needs (Federation of Euro-
pean Accounts [FEE], 2016).
6.5. Lobbying strategies
This study also investigated the lobbying behaviour and Table 7 presents the distribution
of lobbyists’ argumentation strategies. As Panel C in Table 7 suggests, conceptually based
arguments were deployed in 19 responses (22.4% of all the analyzed comment letters),
self-referential arguments were used in six responses (7.1%), and, surprisingly, both argu-
ments were used in 39 comment letters (45.9%) and no arguments at all were used in 21
comment letters (24.7%). Hence, these findings suggest that the most commonly
deployed strategy of argumentation was the use of both conceptual and self-referential
arguments. The findings are partly consistent with the prior studies, many of which
have found that lobbyists used conceptually based arguments most frequently (Giner
& Arce, 2012; Gros & Worret, 2016; Reuter & Messner, 2015). For instance, Gros and
Worret (2016) indicated in particular that the use of conceptually based arguments
seems to be crucial to interest groups because they found such arguments in 83.8%5 of
all the answers that they analyzed. In this study, the conceptual arguments covered
68.3%6 of all the comment letters. This finding supports the prior studies, revealing
that conceptual arguments are more important than self-referential arguments in the
5Conceptually based strategy and both strategies: 45.9% + 37.9%.
6Conceptually based strategy and both strategies: 22.4% + 45.9%.
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lobbying process of audit exemption thresholds. The use of conceptual arguments is per-
ceived as convincing reasoning, which might be more likely to persuade the regulator.
Relatedly, this finding supports the study conducted by Manson and Zaman (1999),
Table 6. Data structure.
First-order concepts Second-order concepts Aggregate dimensions
Opposing arguments
. Auditing creates many positive externalities
because audits increase the trust in information
and therefore the thresholds should not be
increased.
. Accurate financial statements and auditing play a
critical role in advancing the public interest.
. Companies receive economic benefits from
transparent financial reporting and from having
their financial statements audited. The audited
financial statements are crucial for potential
lenders and support the firm in obtaining outside
financing.
. The performance of accountants and accounting
firms is not regulated and monitored like the
performance of auditors in Finland.




. There is skepticism regarding whether the cost
savings are as significant as they are argued to
be.
. The administrative cost is not an appropriate
reason for increasing the audit exemption
thresholds.
Regulatory change is not justified by
expedience
. The respondents require more research and an
impact assessment of the increase in the
thresholds. More research is also required on the
previous change in audit exemption thresholds
in Finland that came into effect in 2007.
. The fears about reduced tax revenue, an
increased grey economy, and economic crime are
actual and evident.
. Because the regulatory changes to audit
exemption in Sweden were not successful,
Finland should not make the same mistakes.
Concern related to unintended
consequences of increasing the audit
exemption thresholds
Supporting arguments
. The current audit exemption thresholds are too
low compared with those in other EU countries.
. According to the Accounting Directive, Member
States should release small companies from the
statutory audit requirement if there is no specific
justification to demand it.
. The Finnish governmental trend should focus on
removing administrative costs.
. The statutory audit requirement for small
companies is argued to be unnecessary
protectionism.




. Low audit exemption thresholds do not give
small companies the opportunity to evaluate the
costs and benefits of auditing themselves.
. Cost is one of the main reasons mentioned for
eliminating the mandatory audit. The costs of the
universal application of the requirement to have
the accounts audited fall disproportionately on




which suggested that audit professionals are expected to comment in an enlightened way in
their submission. For instance, Manson and Zaman (1999) emphasized that auditing pro-
fessionals may have been attempting to highlight their concerns about societal interests in
the comment letters. In the case of academia, it seems natural for this interest group to
deploy mainly conceptually based arguments (Gros & Worret, 2016) because the use of
only self-referential arguments would conflict with the image of professionalism and objec-
tivity favoured by the academic profession. Interestingly, the results of the current study
reveal that a relatively high number of comment letters (24.7%) did not provide any argu-
ments at all during both consultation rounds. The use of no argument is controversial
because usually an agreement with or objection to a proposal without further explanations
or reasoning is not likely to have a great influence on the regulator (Gros &Worret, 2016).
However, this finding is consistent with Reuter and Messner’s (2015) study, which
suggested that providing no argument at all is fairly common, with almost one-third of
comment letters following this approach in their study. Finally, the results of this study
indicate that the use of only self-referential argumentation was unusual and infrequent.
The low rate of only self-referential arguments (7.5%) was potentially due to the expec-
tation that the rule-making body is not convinced by the strategy, which only comprises
the description of the potential effects of the proposed regulation on the respective interest
group. To summarize, the findings suggest that there is not a single predominant strategy
of argumentation. Instead, the use of both arguments is the preferred strategy of the lob-
byists in the current study. Finally, in total 75.4%7 of all the authors of comment letters
chose to justify their position. Consistent with the accounting literature, it can be
assumed that respondents believe that justifying their position is more effective in persuad-
ing the Finnish regulators than not providing a justification. The findings indicate that the
interest groups might think that their lobbying is more powerful and influential if they
present self-referential and conceptual arguments jointly to comment on the regulatory
proposal about audit exemption thresholds in a balanced way.
Summarizing the analysis of the argumentation strategies, this study concludes that
interest groups inform the rule-making body by exploiting their expertise. In other
Table 7. Lobbying strategies (number of comment letters/percentage).
Conceptual Self-referential Both None Total
Panel A: Argumentation during the first round
Opposing 3 (14.3%) 1 (4.8%) 16 (76.2%) 1 (4.8%) 21 (100.0%)
Supporting 2 (20.0%) 1 (10.0%) 2 (20.0%) 5 (50.0%) 10 (100.0%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 8 (72.7%) 11 (100.0%)
Total 8 (19.0%) 2 (4.8%) 18 (42.9%) 14 (33.3%) 42 (100.0%)
Panel B: Argumentation during the second round
Opposing 8 (30.7%) 2 (7.7%) 16 (61.5%) 0 (0.00%) 26 (100.0%)
Supporting 2 (20.0%) 1 (10.0%) 5 (50.0%) 2 (20.0%) 10 (100.0%)
Neutral 1 (14.3%) 1 (14.3%) 0 (0.00%) 5 (71.4%) 7 (100.0%)
Total 11 (25.6%) 4 (9.3%) 21 (48.8%) 7 (16.3%) 43 (100.0%)
Panel C: Argumentation during both rounds
Opposing 11 (23.4%) 3 (6.4%) 32 (68.1%) 1 (2.1%) 47 (100.0%)
Supporting 4 (20.0%) 2 (10.0%) 7 (35.5%) 7 (35.0%) 20 (100.0%)
Neutral 4 (22.2%) 1 (5.6%) 0 (0.00%) 13 (72.2%) 18 (100.0%)
Total 19 (22.4%) 6 (7.1%) 39 (45.9%) 21 (24.7%) 85 (100.0%)
722.4% + 7.1% + 45.9%.
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words, this can be described as informational lobbying and it can be defined as the use by
interest groups of their professional knowledge on matters of importance for policy
makers in an attempt to persuade them to implement particular policies. This type of lob-
bying is often regarded as an important means of influence. Particularly in the Finnish
case, the interest groups were acting as a transmitter of information for the Ministry
of Economic Affairs and Employment by providing meaningful information associated
with the suggested increase in the audit exemption thresholds. By providing relevant
information, the lobbyists could improve the regulatory outcome and minimize the poss-
ible negative consequences of the regulatory change.
Finally, this study attaches a signalling function to interest groups’ use of both argu-
mentation strategies. A combination of the two types of arguments employed by interest
groups may well demonstrate credible expertise and be appreciated by the regulator for
supplying a variety of arguments available for use (Hoffmann & Zülch, 2014). Hence, the
use of conceptual arguments demonstrates sophisticated technical expertise to the regu-
lator and the use of self-referential arguments highlights the consequences. These obser-
vations are in line with Königsgruber’s (2013) view that an important aspect of lobbying
is the transmission of credible information. Especially in a technical area such as auditing
regulation, it might reasonable to expect political actors to be more dependent on infor-
mation input from lobbyists. Hence, the interest groups might have incentives to maxi-
mize social welfare under incomplete information, and therefore, the rule-making body
is viewed as an informed actor.
6.6. Discussing the role and importance of the comment letters in the regulatory
process in Finland
Inviting relevant parties to write comment letters is an important way to enable voices to
be heard on regulations that can have a large impact (Hansen, 2011). The majority of the
comment letters during both submission rounds were relatively clearly against the
increase in the audit exemption thresholds in the current Finnish case. This finding indi-
cates that the reliability of financial statements plays an important role in the Finnish
society. Hence, because of the significant concerns raised in the opposing comment
letters, the Finnish Government decided not to continue with the reform to increase
the audit exemption thresholds. The arguments against increasing the thresholds were
so significant and comprehensive during both rounds that the reform could not be con-
tinued as such (Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2018b). Hence, it
can be suggested that the lobbying opponents might have had a dominant effect. This
could be due to the particular emphasis of possible societal consequences. The
findings indicated that the opponents objected to the increase because considerable
reliance is placed on the audited accounts of small firms in maintaining societal function-
ality, meaning that trust and accuracy are vital for financial reporting quality in the
Finnish culture, and policy makers should not take this to be self-evident. The infor-
mation filed by the Finnish private companies is potentially important. This observation
is supported by the public interest theory. Prior studies have emphasized the important
role of statutory auditing to protect the public interest (Baker et al., 2014).
However, it was discovered that the current statutory audit requirement is not optimal
either because it has been suggested to be too heavy and overdimensioned for small
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companies. The comment letters highlighted that the lighter versions of auditing could be
a possible solution to decrease the administrative burden. Therefore, the Finnish Minis-
try of Economic Affairs and Employment formed a working group to investigate the
adoption of extended reviews for micro and small companies. Thus, it can be suggested
that comment letters matter in the Finnish case and that they play an important role in
the audit exemption regulatory process.
7. Conclusions
Lobbying plays an essential role in the process of accounting and auditing rule making
(Arafat et al., 2020; Gros & Worret, 2016). Hence, this study examined lobbying strat-
egies and comment letters concerning the proposal of increasing the audit exemption
thresholds in Finland. By focusing on a wide range of arguments related to the propo-
sal, the results contribute to the lobbying and audit exemption literature by updating
and extending the previous policy-based discussion about reducing the accounting and
auditing obligations for small companies in Finland and Europe. Most of the comment
letters did not support the suggested regulatory change. The comment letters that were
opposed to the increase stated that statutory audits for smaller companies create posi-
tive externalities because of their incremental contribution to the strength of the infor-
mation environment in which the small companies operate. Furthermore, the societal
value of auditing in the Finnish context was emphasized because the opposing
comment letters clarified that accurate financial statements and auditing play a critical
role in advancing the public interest and the suggested cost savings are debatable. Fur-
thermore, the lobbyists were concerned about the possible negative consequences.
Thus, this study supports Jorissen et al.’s (2006) conclusion that lobbying might
reveal information on the potential costs of future consequences related to the regulat-
ory change. In addition, this study supports Clatworthy and Peel’s (2013) suggestion
that policymakers should carefully consider the consequences when increasing audit
exemption thresholds.
The comment letters supporting the increase can be cautiously interpreted as indicat-
ing that, because other EU countries have relatively high audit exemption thresholds,
Finland should also follow this international trend. The comment letters stated that
there is no need to have stricter regulation than other countries. In addition, the
comment letters that supported the increase suggested that the current governmental
trend in Finland should focus on removing the norms. Hence, freedom of choice for
smaller companies was underlined and administrative burden should be minimized.
To summarize, the inductive analysis revealed two aggregate dimensions that are
related to audit exemption thresholds. The first dimension is the socio-economic
benefits of auditing, which is the main dimension for opposing the increase. The
second aggregate dimension is harmonization with international trends, which is the
key dimension for supporting the increase. The role of these dimensions is significant
because they present the wider picture behind the political discussion that is related to
the increase in the audit exemption thresholds. To conclude, the opposing reasoning
suggests that the benefits provided by statutory auditing for the societal perspective is
seen as a priority compared with the need for reducing the regulatory burden for
small firms.
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Furthermore, this study investigated the behaviour of interest groups and the lobbying
strategies that were deployed. Hence, it also contributes to the lobbying strategies litera-
ture because there have been no attempts so far to study lobbying in the case of audit
exemption thresholds. The findings suggest that the most commonly deployed strategy
of argumentation is the use of both conceptual and self-referential arguments. These
findings indicate that the interest groups might think that their lobbying is more power-
ful and influential if they present self-referential and conceptual arguments jointly to
comment neutrally and in a balanced way on the proposal to increase the thresholds.
To conclude, it is not an easy task to achieve consensus on audit exemption thresholds
for smaller companies because the audit exemption programmes might have negative
unintended consequences. Hence, this study suggests that more scientific research is
clearly needed. Many arguments made for or against the increase need more empirical
evidence. For instance, the analysis revealed that the previous change in audit exemption
thresholds in Finland should be examined more carefully. The comment letters indicated
that more research should be conducted to find alternatives—for instance, a different
kind of assurance for small firms. Therefore, future studies should examine in more
detail the special role of small firms and other assurance services. This study is subject
to the following limitations. The study relies on a qualitative analysis of regulatory struc-
tures related to audit exemption, and it is based on a review and analysis of publicly avail-
able documents. As such, it has similar limitations to other qualitative studies. In
addition, the study focuses on one country, and thus the generalization of the findings
must be approached with caution.
Further information
The earlier version of this study is included in Elina Haapamäki’s dissertation thesis com-
pleted at the University of Vaasa.
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